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Throughout the campaigns in Los Angeles
that gave birth in 1913 to the Los Angeles
Aqueduct, no voice was ever raised on behalf
of the Owens Valley, the distant source of the
prized water. As vigorous as the debate
became, its terms were at all times limited to
the interests of the City of Los Angeles. In 1906
the competing interests of the two communi-
ties clashed on the floor of the United States
Congress, but the Owens Valley ranchers were
outmaneuvered by the city water planners who
successfully encouraged President Theodore
Roosevelt to support the proposed project.1
The story of the valley’s destruction over the
next twenty years is in part the story of the
ranchers’ continuing failure to find a forum in
which to gain a fair hearing for their plight.
In 1907, the ranchers joined in protest
once again at the meeting of the National
Irrigation Congress in Sacramento. They could
not have chosen a worse event for the presen-
tation of their case, however, for the Irrigation
Congress was one of several national organiza-
tions created at this time to back Roosevelt’s
conservationist policies described by the slo-
gan, “Save the forests, store the floods, reclaim
the deserts, make homes on the land.”2 In
Sacramento as in Washington the year before,
the hapless Owens Valley ranchers found
themselves allied with the selfish interests of
the private land and power companies in
opposition to “hysterical conservationism.”3
They were derided in the meeting and the
press as “kickers” of a worthy principle, and as
the San Francisco Call observed of the debates,
“Anybody here who plays tennis at the White
House can have anything he wants from these
people and the kickers had no more chance
than a snowball.”4
In both instances, the ranchers were not
seeking to stop the project but only to assure
that their access to the Owens River stream-
flows would be protected. Unable to affect
development of the aqueduct, however, the
ranchers watched helplessly as Los Angeles
gained virtually complete control over future
settlement in the Owens Valley. When the
Department of the Interior formally dropped
its plans for a reclamation project on the
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Owens River immediately after Los Angeles
passed the bond issue for aqueduct construc-
tion in 1907, the half-million acres of valley
land withdrawn from settlement under the
Homestead Act by the Reclamation Service
were not returned to entry. Instead, along with
all its maps and surveys, the Reclamation
Service gave Los Angeles control of the storage
rights which the Owens Valley ranchers had so
willingly signed over to the federal government
in 1903.5
Opportunities for settlement in the valley
were further restricted in 1908, when Gifford
Pinchot, head of the Forest Service, extended
the borders of the Sierra National Forest
Reserve over an additional 275,000 acres of val-
ley land, despite the fact that no trees grew on
this land. Henceforth, all applications from the
ranchers for settlement or water storage on the
federally protected lands were referred to Los
Angeles, where they met certain rejection.6
“This is not a government by legislation; it
is a government by strangulation,” complained
the congressman from Inyo County, Sylvester
Smith.7 Although President Taft did repeal
Pinchot’s order establishing a forest preserve
in the treeless valley in February, 1911, the
ranchers had determined by this time that they
would have to bargain for their future with Los
Angeles. In 1910, they had opened negotia-
tions with the city officials for an equitable
division of water within the valley.
The prospects for an accommodation
between Los Angeles and the Owens Valley
were better in 1910 than they would ever be
again. Even though the aqueduct had been
under construction for three years by this time,
Los Angeles had still not developed a policy for
disposing of the great surplus of water which
the aqueduct would provide. From September
20 to October 7, the city council held public
hearings twice a week on the question of what
should be done with the excess water after the
city’s immediate needs had been met.
Although there was general agreement that the
city should not alienate its existing rights to
the Owens River water without a two-thirds
vote of approval by the electorate, opinions
divided as to whether the city should sell the
surplus water for the highest possible return or
use the surplus as the instrument of a broader
policy for the annexation and consolidation of
outlying areas.
Mayor George Alexander, who favored the
expansion of the city to include the entire
county of Los Angeles, formed a special com-
mission in November to study both the dispo-
sition of the surplus and the problem of con-
solidation. Early in 1911, the Public Service
Commission, which had charge of the city’s
water program, established its own panel of
consulting engineers to estimate the amount
of the surplus and to formulate a program for
its disposal.8 In their report released a few
months later, the engineers advised that the
opening of the aqueduct would provide the city
with four times as much water as it could con-
sume, leaving an excess of at least 360 second-
feet, enough to irrigate approximately 135,000
acres of land each year.9 Although this was an
amount sufficient to service the needs of the
Owens Valley twice over, such an application of
the surplus was never seriously entertained by
the panel. Instead, their report—named for its
principal signators the Quinton-Code-Hamlin
Report—recommended a general policy for
city expansion. Under this policy, any area out-
side the city limits that desired to share in the
surplus would have to agree to be annexed to
the city as a condition of receipt of the water.
Water would not be supplied to those areas
where there was not a “reasonable assurance”
of ultimate annexation. In addition, any area
receiving water from the aqueduct would be
required to pay in advance the cost of con-
structing a distribution system according to
city specifications and to assume as well a pro-
portionate share of the tax burden for the costs
of the aqueduct.
. . . . 
Throughout [an] extended struggle over
city policy for the disposal of the surplus,
[William] Mulholland’s [negotiated] with the
Owens Valley ranchers [ ]. In May, 1913, a ten-
tative agreement was reached which would
have allowed the ranchers to draw enough
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water to continue operation of their existing irri-
gation systems.22 But the conditions favoring a
peaceful settlement that existed in 1910 had
changed drastically by this time. . . . [T]he sub-
sequent adoption of the Quinton-Code-Hamlin
Report in the months following this tentative
agreement meant that the needs of the San
Fernando Valley would henceforth take prece-
dence over those of the Owens Valley.
. . . .
Thus, the opening of the aqueduct on
November 5, 1913, effectively sealed the fate of
the Owens Valley as it marked the start of
Mulholland’s negotiations with the San
Fernando interests over the delivery of the sur-
plus. Despite acrimonious resistance from the
new towns of the San Fernando Valley,
Mulholland insisted upon annexation as a con-
dition for their receipt of the water. In support of
his case, he cited not only city policy as adopt-
ed from the Quinton-Code-Hanilin Report but
also the terms of the original federal grant of a
right-of-way for the aqueduct, which specified
that the surplus water from the project could be
used for irrigation only within the boundaries of
the city.23 Mulholland’s use of the federal statute
to force the communities of the San Fernando
Valley to join Los Angeles is ironic in view of the
fact that these provisions of the act had been
inserted at President Roosevelt’s request for the
express purpose of assuring that the aqueduct
would not be used for the benefit of the San
Fernando syndicate.24 In exchange for the sur-
render of independence, however, the San
Fernando Valley received favorable considera-
tion in the setting of rates for the aqueduct
water with the result that the valley paid sub-
stantially less for its water than any other area
annexed by the city in this period.25
With the annexation of the first major sec-
tions of San Fernando and Palms in May, 1915,
Los Angeles more than doubled in size from 108
to 285 square miles. Subsequent additions in
1916 and 1917 brought the city’s total land area
to more than 350 square miles, a rate of expan-
sion supported entirely by the introduction of
the aqueduct water.26
By 1920, when the city had expanded to
364 square miles, Mulholland had reason to
worry that the pace of annexation had already
over-reached the project’s capacity of supply.
With regard to supplying water for domestic
use, the problem was more potential than real.
The annexed areas were largely uninhabited,
and the 206 square miles added to the city
between 1915 and 1920 increased the City’s
population by only 12,701. But, with the open-
ing of the Panama Canal in 1914, Los Angeles
had already begun to emerge as the premier
port and commercial center on the West Coast,
and the end of World War I brought a flood of
new immigrants to the city at the rate of
100,000 per year.27
With regard to water for irrigation, on the
other hand, the problem was already acute and
centered almost entirely on the changes in
agricultural production that had occurred in
the San Fernando Valley since the introduction
of aqueduct water. The city water engineers
had originally prepared their plans for supply-
ing water to the San Fernando Valley on the
assumption that the valley’s agricultural econ-
omy would continue to be based upon tree
crops, which required only intermittent irriga-
tion over a long season. When the first aque-
duct water was delivered at the end of May,
1915, the valley had only 10,000 acres under
irrigation, a total which increased to 18,000
acres in the next year. In 1917 and 1918, how-
ever, wartime demand brought a rapid expan-
sion in agricultural production, and the irrigat-
ed area in the valley extended to cover 45,000
and then 75,000 acres. In addition, the crops
changed; instead of trees, large sections of the
valley were given over to the more water-inten-
sive production of beans, potatoes, and truck
garden crops. As a result, during periods of
peak irrigation demand, Los Angeles had to
supply the valley with a third again as much
water as the entire surplus from the aqueduct,
an amount which exceeded at times the total
mean flow of the Owens River.28
Mulholland’s problems of supply were fur-
ther complicated by the fact that in his original
design of the aqueduct, he had failed to
include sufficient reservoir capacity to store
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the winter flows from the High Sierra. Hence in
1921, he proposed a $3 million bond issue for
the improvement of the San Fernando irriga-
tion system and the expansion of reservoirs at
the lower end of the aqueduct. Intense opposi-
tion from the labor-oriented Los Angeles Record,
which campaigned against the bonds on the
issue of syndicate corruption, handed
Mulholland his first defeat in a water bond elec-
tion.
As a result of this setback, Mulholland was
forced to turn back to the Owens Valley, where
the city, under the terms of its original agree-
ment with Fred Eaton, already possessed the
right to construct a small reservoir at the head-
waters of the Owens River. The calculation of
the Owens Valley’s need for irrigation water,
begun in 1913, was rapidly finalized in form sat-
isfactory to the ranchers, and the city once
again offered to guarantee sufficient water,
based on these calculations, to continue agri-
cultural production in the valley at its existing
level. Such a promise was essential because the
construction of a dam on Eaton’s property at
Long Valley would have interfered with the right
of all the downstream owners including those
in the Owens Valley, to the full use of the river
flow. Such rights at this time were held invio-
late by the California courts, and so, to avoid
litigation, Los Angeles had to secure unani-
mous approval of its proposal from all the
downstream owners.29
The possibility for such a uniform agree-
ment, however had been foreclosed by the
events succeeding the collapse of Mulholland’s
friendship with Eaton several years earlier.
Eaton’s original agreement with the city
allowed an easement sufficient for the con-
struction of a 100-foot dam in Long Valley.
While the aqueduct was still under construc-
tion, Eaton had offered to sell Los Angeles the
remainder of his holdings at a price in excess of
$1 million. Because the city had already paid
the entire purchase price of Eaton’s ranch for
control of the water rights and only 20 per cent
of the land, Mulholland considered this second
proposal excessive, and he rebuffed his old
friend declaring, “I’ll buy Long Valley three
years after Fred Eaton is dead.”30
An arrangement whereby Mulholland
would secure control of Long Valley only over
his dead body was perfectly acceptable to Fred
Eaton as well. Embittered, at dagger’s point
with the city, and a pariah in the valley he had
betrayed, Eaton withdrew to his cattle ranch,
refusing even to attend the dedication cere-
monies for the aqueduct he had fathered.
Instead, Eaton returned to his former dreams of
private development of the Owens River and
opened negotiations with a number of private
power companies for the construction of a gen-
erating station below the Long Valley dam site.
Although Eaton failed to profit from the deal,
the Southern Sierra Power Company did suc-
ceed in obtaining a privately held site located
at the point of the greatest power drop in the
middle of the Owens Gorge. This acquisition
blocked the completion of a power generating
plant which Los Angeles had itself begun in the
gorge in 1915.
Late in 1921, the city gained the support of
the Bureau of Reclamation for a joint project at
Haiwee reservoir which would have enabled the
city to develop its power project without going
through the gorge by tunneling instead through
the Mono Craters. But, this project demanded
the diversion of two creeks behind a 150-foot
dam at Long Valley while Eaton’s original
agreement with the city allowed for the con-
struction of only a 100-foot dam.
The city thus found itself trapped in a mul-
tiple stalemate. The city could not proceed with
its own public power development project with-
out either gaining possession of the key site in
the gorge owned by the Southern Sierra Power
Company or making an arrangement with
Eaton for a 150-foot dam at Long Valley. The
development of a private power project by the
Southern Sierra Power Company, on the other
hand, could not proceed unless the city con-
structed a dam at Long Valley to assure an ade-
quate water flow. The development of a dam
and reservoir at Long Valley, in turn, depended
upon a resolution of the water rights problem.
And, the competing water needs of the city, the
ranchers, and the private power developers
could not be met unless the city paid Fred
Eaton’s price, which Mulholland would not do.
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Mulholland chose instead to begin con-
struction on a 100-foot dam while at the same
time instituting proceedings to condemn the
water rights of the power company and to
obtain a right-of-way across its property. A
party of Owens Valley ranchers, later joined by
Eaton, immediately filed suit to stop the small
dam, which they feared would be insufficient to
supply the water the city had promised them.
When the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1922 turned down the city’s action
against the power company, Mulholland
dropped the project altogether.31
With the failure of the Long Valley project
and the advent of a prolonged period of
drought beginning in the winter of 1921-22,
Mullholland embarked upon a three-part pro-
gram for the preservation of the city’s contin-
ued growth and prosperity. For the long term,
he looked toward the development of another
new source of water on the Colorado River,
where federal engineers were preparing prelim-
inary surveys for a dam in Boulder Canyon. For
the short term, he began to advocate a slow-
down in the city’s annexation policies; the
annual report of the Public Service
Commission in 1922, for example, for the first
time warned against further expansion of the
city limits, recommending instead that future
annexations be confined to those territories
which would “tend to make the city’s outline
more symmetrical.”32 These two policies com-
plemented one another, for each area which
was denied access to the aqueduct water by
reason of Mulholland’s new policy of symmetry
became a ready candidate for enlistment in the
Metropolitan Water District that Mulholland
was forming to underwrite the costs of a con-
nection to the Boulder Canyon project.
Meanwhile, in the Owens Valley,
Mulholland moved to assure Los Angeles’ total
control of the valley water supply. The city ini-
tiated a new series of land acquisitions, focus-
ing upon the key properties which controlled
points of access to the river so that the less
favorably situated ranchers inland could be cut
off from their water supply. Further, the Recla-
mation Service was hired to return to the valley
to make soundings for the drilling of pump
wells in the Independence area.33 When the
ranchers discovered that their underground
water supply was being drained off by pumps
on adjacent properties owned by the city, they
appealed first to the County Board of
Supervisors and then to the courts. In each
case where suit was brought, an injunction was
issued which the city invariably vacated by the
simple expedient of buying off the affected
property.34 Individual ranchers along the river
who resisted the blandishments of the city
agents and built their own irrigation ditches
and storage dams had their ditches cut and
dams blown up by city work crews.35
Residents of the Owens Valley recall that
the Owens Valley was “still a beautiful agricul-
tural area” as late as August 1918.36 But as Los
Angeles grew and flourished in the early 1920s,
hard times descended on the valley. Los
Angeles’ control over future settlement badly
undermined the valley’s credit. Local banks
became over-extended, while the national and
state banks that might have provided farm
relief withdrew from the area altogether. Even
the State Veterans Welfare Commission
refused loans to qualified veterans who wished
to locate in the valley.37
Some valley residents continued to dream
of a brighter future. Between 1922 and 1925, for
example, the Town of Bishop constructed a
new high school, American Legion Hall, and
Masonic Temple, while a farmers’ cooperative
in Laws built a large new crop warehouse. A
locally written history published in 1922 con-
cluded on a hopeful note as it observed of the
city officials: “We shall gladly list with them the
professions of amity, whenever by meeting the
just and reasonable demands of Owens Valley,
the city shall show that any consideration it
may extend arises from the sense of equity,
and not merely as an incident in securing some
further concession.”38
With its people thus divided between hope
and despair, the Owens Valley was ill-equipped
to meet Mulholland’s new policy of militancy in
the early 1920’s. The valley ranchers lacked the
financial resources and singleness of purpose
that the city officials could marshall.
Leadership of the valley’s resistance to the
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city’s onslaught fell to the brothers Wilfred and
Mark Watterson, whose string of local banks
united the principal farming communities of
the Owens Valley.39
Under the leadership of the Wattersons, the
ranchers served by the four major irrigation
canals of the upper valley voted on December
26, 1922, to form a consolidated irrigation dis-
trict through which to deal with Los Angeles in
united strength. Before the plan could be con-
firmed, the city struck back by buying out the
owner of the oldest and largest upstream irriga-
tion canal and by bringing suit to block the sale
of bonds by the Wattersons’ district. As Los
Angeles pressed ahead with its purchases in the
upper valley, the ranchers responded by increas-
ing their diversions downstream. While armed
guards kept watch over the ranchers’ diversion
canals, the city found itself confronted with
steadily escalating demands for the cost of the
properties it wished to buy.
In March, 1924, the residents of Bishop
banded together to demand a total of $8 million
for their collective holdings, land and water
combined, plus $750,000 in “reparations” to the
local merchants for the trade they would lose
from the block sale of their community. The
Bishop organization made its offer not to
Mulholland but to a delegation from the San
Fernando Valley where Mulholland had been
restricting the use of aqueduct water needed for
the summer season’s crops. To make matters
worse for Mulholland, the Hearst press on April
21 returned to the story it had once discarded
and began a twelve-part series in the San
Francisco Call which detailed the plight of the
Owens Valley at the hands of Los Angeles.40
Mulholland returned from negotiations in
Washington over the Boulder Canyon project to
deal severely with the multifold challenge to his
authority. He blocked the proposed deal
between the residents of Bishop and the San
Fernando Valley and continued in effect his pro-
hibition on the use of aqueduct water for irriga-
tion in the San Fernando Valley. He publicly
declared his adamant opposition to the pay-
ment of reparations. And, on May 10, he filed
suit to prevent the ranchers from continuing
their diversions of Owens River water.
Mulholland’s aggressively strong stand
helped to bring forward the more violent ele-
ments within the Owens Valley communities.
The anger of the local ranchers had proven a
ripe field of opportunity for the Ku Klux Klan,
then resurgent across the nation and organizing
on a wide range of populist and agrarian issues.
As relations with Los Angeles steadily worsened
through the summer months of 1923 and spring
of 1924, midnight visitations by large bands of
armed men upon the homes of those who
opposed the Wattersons’ irrigation district
became more frequent.41 Finally, in the early
morning hours of May 21, 1924, two weeks after
the announcement of Mulholland’s suit, a band
of forty men planted three boxes of dynamite
along the aqueduct and blew a hole in the city’s
concrete ditch.
The effect of this attack was electric.
Hearst’s series in the Call had helped to awaken
the general public to what was happening in the
Owens Valley; the first explosion on the aque-
duct now brought a flood of reporters from all
over the state to study the situation. In Los
Angeles, although the Times did recall Hearst’s
infamous association with the war with Spain as
it blamed the Call series for inciting the vio-
lence, Mulholland found support for his policies
eroding. On June 24, the Los Angeles Record, long
hostile to Mulholland and the aqueduct, began
a series of editorials demanding the immediate
construction of the Long Valley dam, fair settle-
ments with the Owens Valley ranchers, and
Mulholland’s resignation.42 In July, Los Angeles
Mayor George E. Cryer returned from a personal
tour of the Owens Valley recommending that
the city buy up the entire valley either through
direct negotiations or arbitration.
Mulholland and the Public Service
Commission determined to buck the mayor
while still giving the appearance of attempted
accommodation with the valley ranchers. Not
only did they reject the mayor’s suggestion for
arbitration, a proposal which the ranchers sup-
ported, but they also suspended all negotia-
tions for land purchases in the valley. Instead,
the commission on October 14 abruptly
reversed its prior policies and offered an irriga-
tion plan designed to keep 30,000 acres of the
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valley green. This proposal, based on a report
by J. B. Lippincott, also offered the city’s assis-
tance in constructing a highway to the valley
“to make the scenic region accessible to
tourist travel which should be profitable to the
valley and its citizens.”43
This offer of an apparent compromise was
totally unacceptable to the valley ranchers.
Given its authorship by Lippincott, the valley’s
first betrayor, the proposal was suspect from
the outset. The ranchers had heard such prom-
ises from the city before in 1913 and 1921, and
this one came too late. Acceptance of the pro-
posal would have meant the denial of repara-
tions and the destruction of the Wattersons’
irrigation district. The Wattersons’ strategy, on
the other hand, recognized that the city and
the valley were competitors for the Owens
River water in a contest the valley could not
win. The strategy assumed that the valley
would have to sell out and was geared, in con-
sequence, at obtaining the best price possible.
The ranchers were no longer fighting for their
homes, only for money.
On November 16, 1924, one month after
Los Angeles made its new offer, the ranchers
seized the Alabama Gates which controlled
the main flow of water into the aqueduct. In
open rebellion, they shut the gates and sent
the water spilling back into the river bed. For
four days the ranchers held the gates, sup-
ported by the cheers of hundreds of valley res-
idents. Meanwhile, in Los Angeles, pressures
mounted upon Mulholland to reach an amica-
ble settlement. On November 18, the Los
Angeles Times deserted him, noting editorially
that the ranchers were not anarchists but hon-
est citizens of the hardy stock of pioneers who
made California great: “They have put them-
selves hopelessly in the wrong by taking the
law into their own hands, but that is not to say
that there has not been a measure of justice
on their side of the argument.” The Times con-
cluded by calling upon the Public Service
Commission to pay for the suffering its poli-
cies had caused: “It is not a time to drive the
hardest possible bargain. The city can afford to
be liberal in its settlement with these pioneers
whose work of half a century it will undo.”
On November 20 the siege at the Alabama
Gates ended when the Los Angeles bankers,
through their Joint Clearing House
Association, offered to intercede with the city
to achieve a settlement. The Wattersons,
speaking for the valley, proposed compulsory
arbitration or a cash settlement including
reparations.44 The Public Service Commission
refused to consider either course. On January
19, 1925, the commission rescinded its offer to
keep 30,000 acres of the valley green and
ordered a renewal of its purchasing program.
Despite the failure of the bankers’ efforts
at mediation, the so-called California Civil War
of 1924 did help to focus public attention on
the valley’s plight. The valley ranchers no
longer had to deal exclusively with Los
Angeles but could instead carry their com-
plaint to the larger forum of public opinion in
an effort to obtain crucial relief from the state
government. After the seizure of the Alabama
Gates, Governor Friend W. Richardson dis-
patched the state engineer, Wilbur F. McClure,
to study the situation. McClure’s report, sub-
mitted January 9, 1925, took the ranchers’ side
in the dispute over reparations. In May, the
legislature followed through with the adoption
of a bill specifically allowing the payment of
reparations, thereby undercutting
Mulholland’s claim that he had no legal right
to compensate valley merchants for their loss-
es.45
The pressure of population growth in Los
Angeles had worked to end any prospect of the
valley’s long-term survival but, once the ranch-
ers accepted this conclusion, these same pres-
sures turned to their advantage and forced
Mulholland toward acceptance of their terms
of sale. By 1925, the oil boom in Long Beach
and the growth of the motion picture industry
combined to make it all the more imperative
that the city settle quickly to remove any fur-
ther threats to its embattled water supply. In
May, 1925, the Public Service Commission
offered to buy all lands tributary to the Owens
River. The first to take the city up on this offer
was Wilfred Watterson, an action which
caused his allies in the valley to question why
they should continue to hold out while he had
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not. Watterson explained that the money was
needed to continue to fuel the resistance move-
ment in the valley, and he thereby retained his
leadership position. The city’s attempts to
obtain further purchases, however, quickly ran
aground, and by the summer of 1925, the dyna-
miting of the aqueduct was renewed. The pres-
sure on the city increased throughout 1926 as
valley resistance hardened. Prices demanded of
the city steadily increased, while the merchants
busily filed their reparations claims under the
new law.46 All of this activity proceeded to the
intermittent punctuation of explosions along
the aqueduct.
With the arrival of 1927, events began to
converge which again worked to the valley’s
advantage. In Washington, D.C., Mulholland’s
drive to tap the waters of the Colorado River
was coming to a vote. Arrayed against him were
the state’s private water and power interests
allied with the most ardent editorial defenders
of the free enterprise system in a battle which
proved to be the forerunner for the conflict over
development of the Central Valley that domi-
nated the 1930s. Meanwhile, in Sacramento,
the presentation of a new state water plan and
a series of court decisions unfavorable to order-
ly water development forced the issue of water
to the fore. In the midst of both disputes stood
the Owens Valley, a model of the dangers of
Mulholland’s policy and an example of the need
for overhauling the state’s outmoded water
laws.
In March, the legislature began a series of
public hearings on a proposed constitutional
amendment which would require the owner of
property adjacent to an existing stream-flow to
make reasonable use of his water.47 The
Wattersons, now at the head of a unified resist-
ance group titled the Owens Valley Property
Owners Protective Association, seized upon the
occasion of these legislative hearings to pres-
ent the valley’s case directly to the people. On
March 20 and again on March 22, the associa-
tion bought full-page advertisements in each of
California’s major newspapers in which they
detailed the plight of the Owens Valley, “a name
writ in water. . . characters salt with tears and
stained in blood.” This passion appeal was
immediately echoed in a series of articles print-
ed in the Sacramento Union from March 29
through April 3.
Although extreme examples of the purple
rhetoric popular in journalistic prose of the
period, the association advertisements togeth-
er with the Union articles marked a sophisticat-
ed departure from the appeals of old. Gone
were the fatal associations with the interests of
private power companies and the unpopular
opposition to “hysterical conservationism”
which had proved so detrimental to the valley’s
interest in 1906 and 1907. Instead, these arti-
cles found more common strains with which to
sound the heart strings of their readers. They
described an authentic American tragedy, rich
with Biblical overtones, which touched one of
America’s fond cultural themes: conflict
between the city and the frontier, the strong,
sophisticated society against the weaker primi-
tive, the machine run rampant amidst the
primeval garden.
In the advertisements in the Sacramento
Union, the Owens Valley became a democratic
Eden threatened by the aqueduct, “an evil ser-
pent, bringing ruin as nother serpent did to the
earliest valley in human history.” The advertise-
ment further described how “the sturdy winners
of the wilderness, whose fibre made America
great, . . . pushed back the disputing sands and
reared the homes of their families, the halls of
their democracy, and the altars and thanes of
their God—until happy, lovely Owens Valley
was a fairyland of beauty surrounded by peaks
and desert and dotted with monuments to
human industry.”
Through this frontier paradise the Union
stories followed “the trail of the wreckers,” pre-
senting “a record of political ownership run
rabid, the record of a great city which raised
itself above the law.” Here the Union watched
the destruction of the fruit orchards by city trac-
tors: “Shame-faced Los Angeles removing the
traces of civilization in the hope that the future
will not curse her.” There the Union found an
abandoned schoolhouse with flag still flying,
“its blood-red stripes now twined and twisted
with the halyard . . . tired of neglect . . . the last
thing to yield to the decree of abandonment.”
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In the press, Mulholland emerges through-
out as the cruelest of villains, architect of “a
policy of ruthlessness, of ‘sink without trace,’ of
brutality and sharp practice which leads crooks
to jail or makes them fugitives from justice.”
When asked by the Union what justice he felt
was due to the Owens Valley ranchers,
Mulholland was quoted in reply, “Justice! Why
there are not enough trees in the valley to give
the _______ ______ _______[sic] justice! “
The immediate impact of this appeal was
felt even before the Union series had run its
course. On March 25, the assembly committee
on constitutional amendments held hearings
on the proposed amendment which would
have tended to restrict the rights of the valley
ranchers as riparian owners. The committee
stripped the bill of its enforcement powers,
leaving a toothless statement of general policy,
and passed it to the Floor without a recom-
mendation for passage. Then, on March 31,
Assemblyman Dan E. Williams of Chinese
Camp announced that he would ask Governor
Clement C. Young to allow the legislature to
act as an arbiter in the controversy between
Los Angeles and the Owens Valley. When this
effort failed, Williams headed a special assem-
bly investigating committee which set out on
April 16 to visit the valley personally. As guests
of the Property Owners Protective Association,
the assembly delegation met with 200 ranchers
in Bishop on the night of Saturday, March 17.
The following Monday, the committee con-
vened again in Sacramento for hearings on a
resolution introduced by Williams which
damned Los Angeles and all its works in the
Owens Valley. After seven hours of bickering,
the Los Angeles officials refused to participate
further in the committee hearings. Before the
chief counsel for the city representatives left,
he told the committee that, regardless of what
had happened in the Owens Valley, Los
Angeles would enter any other part of the
state, including the San Joaquin Valley, if it
needed the water. He concluded with the dec-
laration that Los Angeles had the money to do
what it pleased.48 On Friday, March 23, after a
tumultuous debate highlighted by a fistfight
on the floor of the assembly chamber, the
Williams resolution criticizing Los Angeles
passed by a vote of 43 to 34.49
Encouraged by their success in
Sacramento, the ranchers of the Owens Valley
resolved to stand firm against the city. At the
beginning of the year, Los Angeles set a dead-
line of May 1, 1927, for the acceptance of the
city’s offer to buy riparian lands in the valley;
after that date, Los Angeles declared with
dubious legality, no reparations payments
would be made. The ranchers ignored the
deadline. On May 27, one of the largest
siphons on the aqueduct was blown up. The
next night, sixty more feet of pipe were
destroyed. Los Angeles assembled 600
reservists at the city police headquarters and
dispatched a contingent of private detectives
to the valley armed with Winchesters and
tommy guns with orders to shoot to kill anyone
found loitering around the aqueduct.50
Undeterred, the ranchers blew up portions of
the aqueduct again on the nights of June 4, 19,
and 24. On June 10, Los Angeles sent an entire
trainload of guards to the valley bearing
sawed-off shotguns. No blood had been shed
in the “Civil War” of 1924, but, in the super-
heated atmosphere of the va1ley in the sum-
mer of 1927, the stage was set for a violent con-
frontation of major proportions.
Mulholland, however, had already pre-
pared a killing blow by which he meant to end
the conflict once and for all. In planning the
destruction of the Owens Valley, he had
throughout displayed a preference for attack-
ing the valley economy rather than its resi-
dents directly. Accordingly, he turned once
again to the Los Angeles business community,
which had borne his project to completion, to
save it now from further destruction.
Mulholland’s line of attack was directed at
the valley banks owned by the Watterson
brothers. In October, 1926, Mulholland con-
tacted the Bank of America to secure their
assistance in establishing a branch in Bishop
to compete with the Wattersons’ banks. The
application for a charter was made in the
names of five valley residents who had already
sold their holdings to the city for a combined
total of $414,000.51 Mulholland, however, had
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succeeded too well in undermining the econo-
my of the Owens Valley, and the United States
Comptroller of the Treasury refused to issue a
charter for a national bank on the grounds that
there was not sufficient business in the valley
to justify another bank. Similarly, the state
bank commissioner also refused the applica-
tion after a hearing on March 31, 1927, at which
the Owens Valley representatives warned that
the new bank was a front for the city which
intended to drive the Wattersons out of busi-
ness and thereby secure all the mortgages out-
standing in the valley.
During the process of application, however,
Los Angeles officials had obtained detailed
financial statements on the Wattersons’ opera-
tions which suggested that some bank funds
had been diverted to other Watterson enter-
prises. On August 2, 1927, Mulholland took
this evidence to the state corporations com-
missioner, who dispatched a state bank inves-
tigator to the Owens Valley. Three days later,
the Watterson banks closed while an audit was
conducted, and on August 10, both brothers
were jailed on charges of embezzlement. At
their trial, the brothers did not deny the charge
that they had channeled more than $2.3 mil-
lion of the ranchers’ savings into their own
companies, and their explanation that they
had acted only to preserve valley industries in
the face of the city’s onslaught was ruled inad-
missible. Convicted on all counts, the brothers
were sentenced to concurrent terms of one to
ten years in San Quentin.52
For the Owens Valley, this was the cruelest
in a long history of betrayals. Scarcely a ranch-
er or merchant in the valley did not have a
mortgage from the Watterson banks. With their
lifesavings lost and their property forfeit, the
ranchers’ resistance was broken. The long war
was over. Following the Wattersons’ conviction
on November 12, 1927, someone posted a sign
on the north side of Bishop reading, “Los
Angeles City Limits.”53
The year 1927 marked the culmination of
Mulholland’s achievements on several fronts.
In addition to securing the city’s water supply
in the Owens Valley, Mulholland succeeded,
after three years of intensive lobbying in
Sacramento, in obtaining the legislature’s
approval of a bill creating the Metropolitan
Water District. With this victory, the Public
Service Commission called for the formal sus-
pension of the city’s annexation program until
the new water from the Colorado River became
available.54
Any joy Mulholland may have found in
these events, however, was short-lived, for the
failure of the Long Valley project which had
accelerated the destruction of the Owens
Valley had also set Mulholland on a course
which proved his ultimate undoing. Desperate
for the reservoir capacity that had been denied
at Long Valley in 1922, Mulholland in 1924
began construction of a new dam in San
Francisquito Canyon to store the water flowing
into the ocean from the city’s power plants
upstream. The dynamite attacks upon the
aqueduct that summer spurred Mulholland’s
rush to build a secure storage facility at the Los
Angeles end of the project, far from the scene
of battle in the Owens Valley.
Mulholland’s haste in bringing the Saint
Francis Dam into service only compounded the
error he had made in not including a reservoir
at Long Valley in his initial design of the aque-
duct. Completed in May, 1926, the Saint
Francis Dam was unfortunately located upon
the San Andreas Fault, and within two years it
began to show signs of leakage. On March 12,
1928, Mulholland himself inspected the struc-
ture and declared it safe. That same night the
dam collapsed. A 100-foot wall of water bear-
ing huge chunks of concrete on its crest swept
down the Santa Clara Valley and obliterated
three towns and more than 400 lives along its
path.55 Mulholland assumed full responsibility
for this greatest unnatural disaster in
California history.
Mulholland’s shortcomings as an engineer
thus worked to undermine all the skill he had
displayed in retaining his position at the head
of the city’s water program through more than
forty years of political transition. In
Washington, the future of the Swing-Johnson
Bill, which would open the way to construction
of Boulder Dam, was still in doubt. The plight
of the Owens Valley at the hands of Los
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Angeles combined with the Saint Francis Dam
disaster to cause the city’s supporters in
Congress a degree of embarrassment they
could ill afford in the midst of their negotia-
tions over the Boulder Canyon project. As the
architect of both the dam and the city’s policies
toward the Owens Valley ranchers, Mulholland
had become a liability that could no longer be
sustained. “I envy the dead,” he told the coro-
ner’s inquest investigating the Saint Francis
Dam disaster in the summer of 1928.56 At the
end of November, almost a year to the day after
the Watterson brothers entered San Quentin
and only a month before president Coolidge
signed the Swing-Johnson Act, Mulholland
resigned in disgrace.
With Mulholland gone, Los Angeles, begin-
ning in February, 1929, moved swiftly to settle
accounts in the Owens Valley by purchasing
the remaining townships and privately held
ranchlands. Throughout this last series of pur-
chases, the city adhered strictly to
Mulholland’s original precepts that there be no
arbitration and no payment of reparations. The
city did agree to increase the 1929 market
prices set by its own panel of appraisers
according to a schedule of percentage adjust-
ments which reflected the depreciation of mar-
ket values since 1923. But no payments were
made for estimated business losses or for the
value of fixtures and equipment, and all sales
were conditioned upon a release of the city
from liability for any reparations claims.57 On
these terms, the city, by May, 1933, had
expanded its holdings in the valley to include
95 percent of all farmlands and 85 percent of
the town properties.58
By agreeing to purchase at artificially
inflated prices, Los Angeles wound up paying
taxes to Inyo County on assessments which in
some cases exceeded the actual market value
of the properties involved.59 In the years of the
Depression that followed, these generous set-
tlements proved a boon to many valley
refugees, as did the opportunity for short-term
employment on the aqueduct. But for those
who chose to remain and work their ranches,
Los Angeles’ policies were less kind. Although
the city did agree to lease back the farms it had
acquired at an annual rate of 6 percent of the
purchase price plus taxes, these leases were
granted for no more than five years and were
cancelable at any time on the city’s option.
Most important, the granting of a lease carried
with it no promise of a continued water supply.
Los Angeles promptly made the perils atten-
dant to such an agreement abundantly clear to
the ranchers in 1930 when the city abruptly
cancelled nearly all of its leases and diverted
the entire flow of the Owens River to the San
Fernando Valley during the peak of the irriga-
tion season.60
Fred Eaton, meanwhile, did not escape the
fate of his neighbors in the valley. His dreams
of a cattle empire never came to fruition. In
1926, at a time when the Eaton Land and
Cattle Company was floundering, the other
officers of the firm took out a $200,000 loan
from the Watterson banks, offering Eaton’s
land at Long Valley as security. When the
Watterson banks collapsed, the $200,000 went
with them, and the note on Eaton’s land was
sold to a Los Angeles bank which promptly ini-
tiated foreclosure proceedings. Together,
Eaton and Mulholland had conceived the
aqueduct and labored to make it a reality. In
the end, they both became its victims.61
As the ranchers left and the valley’s econo-
my shifted to tourism and agricultural activi-
ties such as cattle grazing and feed-crop pro-
duction which had low water needs, tranquility
was restored to the Owens Valley. In 1939, the
city began to loose its grip by offering to sell
portions of its land while reserving to itself all
water rights. Relations between the city and
the valley have remained sensitive, however,
and on those rare occasions when the valley
residents have joined to protest some aspect
of city policy, Los Angeles officials have some-
times responded with a display of gratuitous
cruelty that recalls Mulholland at his worst.
In 1944, for example, the city reversed an
earlier policy of giving preference to leasehold-
ers in the sale of its properties and began
instead to conduct its sales by scaled bids.
When the valley leaseholders protested, Los
Angeles retaliated by increasing the rents
charged on all of its properties in the Owens
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Valley. This action was taken at a time when
federally-enforced wartime rent controls were
in effect across the country, and the notices of
the increase, effective January 1, 1945, were
mailed to arrive during Christmas week.62
Similarly, in the early 1970s the valley resi-
dents obtained a court order requiring the city
to submit an environmental impact report
before engaging in an increased pumping pro-
gram which threatened to lower the valley’s
water table still further. When the city pro-
duced the required report within one month
and the valley residents sought a court review
of the report’s adequacy, Los Angeles abruptly
announced that it was cutting off all water to
its agricultural and recreational lessees in the
Owens Valley. On Friday, September 20, 1974,
the city mailed notice of the cutoff which took
place the following Monday, September 23. To
shut off water, city workers had to dynamite
irrigation valves that been rusted open since
the aqueduct’s completion sixty years before.
In a public statement, Duane L. Georgeson, the
city engineer responsible for the aqueduct,
denied that the city’s extreme action was a
punitive measure and described it instead as
“educational.”63
Such incidents have helped to keep alive
the memory of Los Angeles’ actions in the
Owens Valley from one generation of valley
residents to the next. This residual bitterness
together with the high drama of the events
themselves, has no doubt helped to fuel the
continuing controversy over the old charge
that the aqueduct was built to serve the inter-
ests of Henry Huntington and his associates in
the San Fernando syndicate.64
The syndicate’s interest in the aqueduct,
while considerably more than coincidental,
was something less than corrupting. To say
that the financial leaders of Los Angeles in the
early part of this century exercised great influ-
ence over the conduct of municipal affairs, and
that some consequently benefited from the
exercise of this influence, is simply to state a
characteristic which was obvious in many
aspects of the city’s administration during this
era. Yet, for all the profits derived from the
project, the syndicate did not pervert the aque-
duct’s purpose. Rather, the aqueduct amply ful-
filled the synthetic need for which it was creat-
ed: the city’s population increased twelvefold
between 1900 and 1930 while its land area mul-
tiplied by ten.
The ethic of growth and not simply the
greed of a few Los Angeles financiers laid
waste to the Owens Valley. For all of the decep-
tion Mulholland practiced in promoting the
project, the fact of the syndicate’s interest was
consistently central, but never a sufficient
argument in any of the elections affecting the
aqueduct to block the project and the general
prosperity it promised. Los Angeles
approached the Owens Valley as an expanding
enterprise seeking a resource for exploitation.
The decision to sacrifice the future of the
Owens Valley for the sake of development in
the San Fernando Valley was made unilaterally
by the city, but it involved a choice between
competing public interests. All of the efforts of
the Owens Valley ranchers in the 1920’s came
too late to reverse this policy. The ranchers’
fate had been sealed at the moment President
Roosevelt determined in 1906 that the greater
public interest would be served by a greater
Los Angeles.
In his last annual message to Congress,
Roosevelt reflected upon the changes which
were occurring in the nation as the result of the
growth of giant corporations, national labor
organizations, and the new urban metropolis-
es: “The chief breakdown is in dealing with the
new relations that arise from the mutualism,
the interdependence of our time. Every new
social relation begets a new type of wrong-
doing—of sin, to use an old-fashioned word—
and many years always elapse before society is
able to turn this sin into crime which can be
effectively punished.”65
In the case of the Owens Valley, the evolu-
tion of the law that Roosevelt predicted began
almost immediately. When the state senate
sent an investigating committee to the Owens
Valley in 1931, for example, it was acting not
simply to berate the city but, more important-
ly, to prevent the repetition of a similar conflict
as Los Angeles extended the aqueduct into the
Mono Basin. Aided in part by the recommen-
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dations that grew out of this investigation, the
legislature that same year adopted California’s
“County of Origin Law” which prohibits the
exploitation of rural areas like the Owens
Valley by establishing a means of mediating
conflicts over future water needs.66
In addition, the example of the Owens
Valley aided the resistance in the struggles that
followed over the construction of new public
water projects in California. In 1927, for exam-
ple, the Sacramento Union did not forego draw-
ing an obvious moral from its series of stories
on the Owens Valley: “There is a warning to be
heeded. Here is a case where political owner-
ship of public utilities had full sway for demon-
stration. The city concerned reverted to ruth-
lessness, savage disregard for moral and eco-
nomic equations, to chicanery and faith break-
ing. . . . The municipality became a destroyer,
deliberately, unconscionably, boastfully.”67
More than any other individual, William
Mulholland, through the building of the aque-
duct and the formation of the Metropolitan
Water District, established the principle of
public ownership of water indelibly on
California history. The growth of Los Angeles
demonstrated the validity of the principle, just
as the memory of the Owens Valley made its
further advancement all the more difficult. The
damage done by Mulholland to the principle
he worked all his life to establish may provide
the harshest judgment of his action, for, in the
end, Mulholland’s methods poisoned the lega-
cy he left behind.
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